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INTRODUCING THE "NEW HANDSHAKE"




There was a time when individuals would meet in person to make
purchases and do deals. They would discuss the terms, assess the
trustworthiness and character of their contracting partners, and conclude
the deal with a handshake. The handshake was more than a kind gesture.
It helped ensure the enforcement of the deal without need for the rule of
law or legal power. Reputations and respect were at stake because
individuals worked in the same community and knew each other's friends
and business partners. That handshake was one's bond-it was a personal
trust mark.
Those days are gone. We do not do deals on a handshake any more.
We seem to have lost interest in face-to-face meetings in our digitized
society. We text; we Skype; we FaceTime; we send e-mails. We do not
connect in person because we conclude contracts in virtual spaces. The
physical handshake is dying, especially in business-to-consumer ("B2C")
contexts. "Buying local" may be in vogue for farmers' markets and limited
purchases, but it makes little economic sense for a growing body of
consumer commerce. Instead, consumers increasingly turn to the internet
for buying needs and make any in-person purchases at big box stores where
they rarely have any personal connections.
Along with this growth of eCommerce have come both connections
and disconnections. The internet empowers companies and consumers. It
gives companies access to multitudes of customers and connects consumers
with companies they would never otherwise encounter in the physical
world. The internet has become a gateway to an ever-expanding and
globalized eMarketplace for consumer goods and services. Nonetheless,
the internet has created disconnections in B2C exchanges by allowing
* Amy J. Schmitz, Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law. I thank Chelsea
Carr, Laura Drees, and Mary Sue Greenleaf for their research assistance, and Colin Rule for his
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companies to easily hide from responsibility behind the anonymity and
depth of the internet. Customer service representatives operating wholly
online do not have to look online customers in the eye when denying
remedies, and feel less beholden to customers that are replaceable by a
seemingly bottomless barrel of consumers who shop online.
These disconnections also fuel the inequities of the "squeaky wheel
system" ("SWS") in B2C exchanges.' This conception of the SWS builds
on the notion that the "squeaky wheels"-who are proactive in pursuing
their needs and complaints-are most likely to get the assistance, remedies,
and other benefits they seek.2 Meanwhile, those who remain silent because
they lack the knowledge, experience, and/or resources to artfully and
actively pursue their interests usually do not receive the same benefits.
This means that the individuals who already enjoy disproportionate power
due to social or economic status are usually the "squeaky wheels" that
receive the disproportionate benefits-thus perpetuating the divide between
the consumer "haves" and "have-nots."
The SWS in B2C contracts has allowed merchants to cut costs by
rationing remedies for purchase complaints.' Merchants know that the bulk
of consumers are unaware of available remedies and only a very small
handful have the requisite confidence and resources to become squeaky
wheels.' Merchants may therefore maximize their profits by providing
remedies to only those very few who are sufficiently persistent in pursing
their complaints. Furthermore, the especially pushy consumers may
manipulate the SWS to essentially "bully" companies into providing them
with special benefits that they may not deserve.
Meanwhile, companies avoid legitimate complaints of the less vocal
customers who tend to be those with the least power and resources. This
1. Amy J. Schmitz, Access to Consumer Remedies in the Squeaky Wheel System, 39 PEPP.
L. REv. 279 (2012).
2. Squeaky wheels get the grease (sometimes).. ., QUOTECOUNTERQUOTE.COM, (Aug. 23,
2010), http://www.quotecounterquote.com/2010/08/squeaky-wheels-get-grease-sometirnes.html,
[http://perma.cc/4ZMG-GGLV]. "The squeaky wheel gets the grease" is generally "fa]ttributed
to American humorist Josh Billings (1818-1885) [flrom a poem titled 'The Kicker,' although the
poem reportedly "does not appear in Billings' own published works." Id. "In the 1800s, the term
'kicker' meant someone who was a constant complainer." Id. However, "[t]he idea that a
complainer is like a squeaky wheel who stops making noise when he gets 'greased' or 'oiled'
(i.e., is given what he's yammering to get) may predate Billings." Id.
3. See Arthur Best & Alan R. Andreasen, Consumer Response to Unsatisfactory Purchases:
A Survey ofPerceiving Defects, Voicing Complaints, and Obtaining Redress, II L. & SOC'Y REV.
701, 702 (1977) (noting that sellers choose to use "less stringent quality control practices" and
simply compensate those that complain about defective products).
4. See id. at 711-12 (finding that only 39.7% of consumers who experience purchase
problems complain to the company, report it to a third party, or take any sort of action).
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perpetuates a system of status-based treatment.5 It also allows companies
to impose fees and one-sided contract terms on the consumer masses that
remain uninformed about their rights or the availability of benefits.6 The
one-sided contract terms often limit or disclaim remedies, thus diminishing
consumers' remedies.
This SWS also prevents economists' proposed "informed minority"
from policing the fairness of contract terms and business practices.7
Economists posit that regardless of whether most consumers ignore
contract terms, a minority of consumers will police fairness for the good of
all consumers by informing the majority of unfair practices and threatening
to go elsewhere if companies do not make appropriate changes. 8 In reality,
however, it is doubtful that there are enough "informed" consumers who
read or shop for purchase terms beyond price and a few other provisions
particular to their needs.9 Furthermore, the informed minority often lack
the resources or savvy necessary to obtain remedies in the SWS.
Moreover, those who obtain the remedies may be unaware that others have
not received the same benefits, and have little to no incentive to share
information about rationed benefits with the uninformed masses who
subsidize the SWS through their inaction. 0 This is especially problematic
when it involves health and safety information regarding merchants'
products. "
5. See, e.g., R. Ted Cruz & Jeffrey J. Hinck, Not My Brother's Keeper: The Inability of an
Informed Minority to Correct for Imperfect Information, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 635, 672-76 (1996)
(discussing how sellers differentiate among buyers by providing contract changes and
adjustments to only the most sophisticated consumers who complain).
6. See id. at 674-75 (noting that sellers often provide repairs for complaining customers to
stop them from creating "bad will for sellers," while they continue to deny such repairs for the
"uninformed masses who simply bear the loss").
7. See Lee Goldman, My Way and the Highway: The Law and Economics of Choice of
Forum Clauses in Consumer Form Contracts, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 700, 714-16 (1992) (explaining
the informed minority argument).
8. See Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect
Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 630, 637-39 (1979) (explaining
the theory that competition among firms for searchers should tend to protect all consumers).
9. See Yannis Bakos et al., Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Testing a Law and
Economics Approach to Standard Form Contracts 3 (N.Y.U. Law & Econ. Research Paper
Series, Working Paper No. 09-40, 2009), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1i443256, [http://pe
rma.cc/FHF2-QDNN] (studying the internet browsing of 45,091 households and finding that only
one or two out of every thousand shoppers studied online software merchants or accessed their
websites); see also LARRY A. DIMATTEO ET AL., VISIONS OF CONTRACT THEORY:
RATIONALITY, BARGAINING, AND INTERPRETATION 28-30 (2007).
10. See Peter A. Alces & Jason M. Hopkins, Symposium, Carrying a Good Joke Too Far, 83
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 879, 895-96 (2008) (discussing how businesses may discriminate in favor of
sophisticated consumers).
11. See Many miss out, CONSUMERREPORTS.ORG, (Feb. 2011),
[Vol. 26524
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In sum, the SWS in B2C exchanges allows businesses to relinquish
responsibility to consumers, ration remedies, and thwart consumer
protection enforcement to the detriment of those with the least resources
and information.12 This creates a need for expanded and equalized access
to remedies in order to address the broken market and revive companies'
sense of responsibility underlying the "handshake" of yore. 13 Furthermore,
consumers must be aware of remedy systems for them to be meaningful.14
Here is where the internet's connection potential shines. It opens doors to
online dispute resolution ("ODR") systems that utilize cost-effective
negotiation, mediation, and arbitration processes for resolving
complaints-and thus creates a "New Handshake."
ODR can be especially effective and satisfying for low dollar claims
such as those in most B2C contexts because of its efficiencies. ODR
systems help address the SWS by lowering the costs and burdens of
pursing purchase complaints so that all consumers, regardless of power and
resources, feel comfortable and able to seek assistance. Online complaint
systems also create transparency around seller behavior and give voice to
common consumers who may then police market fairness and empower
others to "vote with their feet." This could help address power imbalances
that have hindered market regulation in B2C commerce.
Accordingly, this essay discusses how use of ODR systems may help
address the problematic results of the SWS in B2C exchanges. Part II of
the essay discusses possible reasons why the SWS has flourished in the
consumer marketplace and provides some of the applicable behavioral,
social, and empirical research." Part III then uncovers problematic
consequences of the SWS in B2C exchanges,16 and Part IV proposes the
"New Handshake" through tailored ODR systems that offer consumers
efficient and fair means for accessing remedies with respect to their
http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/magazine-archive/201 1/february/home-garden/bad-products/
recall-notifications/index.htm, [http://perma.cc/7VNL-SFA9] (highlighting 2010 survey findings
indicating that "[o]nly a fifth of U.S. adults were aware of having purchased food, medication, or
a product (other than a car) that was recalled in the past three years," and the reasons for this lack
of information).
12. See discussion infra Parts IIA, Ill.
13. See discussion infra Part V.
14. See, e.g., Servicemembers Civil Relief Act: Information on Mortgage Protections and
Related Education Efforts, GAO-14-221, U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., (Jan. 2014),
http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/660397.pdf, [http://perma.cc/7PTS-RXNC] (finding that service
members were not taking advantage of special mortgage protections due to lack of information
and education regarding these remedies).
15. See discussion infra Part II.
16. See discussion infra Part Ill.
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purchases." Part V concludes with an invitation to continue the
development of such ODR systems in an effort to foster revived corporate
responsibility and bridge the growing gap between the consumer "haves"
and "have-nots."1
II. WHY THE SWS THRIVES IN B2C EXCHANGES
Individuals who persistently pursue their needs are usually those most
likely to get what they want. This may be fair when it rewards individuals
for exerting time and resources to pursue their needs.' 9 It is problematic,
however, when it perpetuates contract discrimination, curbs consumer
rights, and allows companies to hide contract and product improprieties
from the majority.
A. BUSINESS BENEFITS OF APPEASING COMPLAINERS
Businesses benefit from using the SWS to curb costs by rationing
remedies and limiting customer assistance. Merchants therefore tend to
provide assistance only for the few squeaky wheel consumers who are
persistent in pursuing their needs.20 Businesses also have cut costs by
shrinking or eliminating telephone assistance, causing consumers to give
up on seeking assistance after long hold times on the telephone.2'
Consumers also have become frustrated with companies' lack of replies to
their e-mails.
This rationing of remedies and assistance also allows businesses to
monopolize complaint resolution to their benefit, knowing that consumers
very rarely take complaints to the courts, federal regulators, or third parties
such as their local chamber of commerce or the Better Business Bureau
("BBB"). 22  Studies show that buyers never voice two-thirds of the
problems they perceive, and very few of the remaining one-third go further
to report their complaints to third parties.23  Furthermore, reported
complaints are only the "tip-of-the-iceberg" to the extent that many
consumers-especially those of lower socioeconomic status-do not even
17. See discussion infra Part IV.
18. See discussion infra Part V.
19. See, e.g., Cruz & Hinck, supra note 5, at 673-75.
20. Best & Andreasen, supra note 3, at 701, 727 (noting study findings showing that
satisfaction rates for complaint resolution for frequently purchased products were higher than
those for infrequently purchased goods, although rates for products generally were higher than
those for services).
21. See generally id. at 713-15.
22. Id. at 713-14.
23. Id. at 709-12, 727-30 (distilling consumers' responses to perceived problems).
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realize their rights to complain.24 Consumers have come to expect poor
products and services. Nonetheless, they also have become savvier in
seeking out trustworthy merchants, which ultimately disadvantages the
shortsighted poor performing companies.
It also is economically wise for businesses to appease squeaky wheels
because their loyalty boosts bottom lines.25 It pays to appease complainers
in order to retain their loyalty, especially considering the additional costs of
seeking to attract new customers. For example, marketing analysis
indicates that it is roughly five times harder to attract new customers than
to retain current ones, which translates into 25 to 85 percent higher profits
merely by retaining 5 percent more current customers. 26  Furthermore,
appeased complainers are even more loyal than customers who never had
complaints regarding their purchases. 27  Appeased complainers also are
more likely than others to recommend a business to friends and family.28
However, dissatisfied complainers may significantly damage
companies' reputations and goodwill. This is because they are usually the
type of proactive individuals prone to share their negative experiences,
which is particularly troubling for companies considering the growth of
social media and complaint sites like Yelp.29 Customers unhappy with
companies' products or services have a broad range of venues for
complaints that directly impact sales. Companies and consumers are now
well aware of reviews on Amazon.com, for example. As another example,
eBay's "Top Rated Plus" pushes the merchants with the best reviews and
24. Id. at 701-03, 706-08 (noting divergent perception rates based on socioeconomic status
and race).
25. See WOLF J. RINKE, DON'T OIL THE SQUEAKY WHEEL: AND 19 OTHER CONTRARIAN
WAYS TO IMPROVE YOUR LEADERSHIP EFFECTIVENESS 133-38 (2004) (discussing the
importance of "wowing" customers, even if it is in response to complaints).
26. Id. at 138.
27. See Tibbett L. Speer, They Complain Because They Care, 18 AM. DEMOGRAPHICS 13
(1996) (noting "grousers are likely to remain loyal" if they are happy with resolution of their
complaints); Lenden Webb, Brainstorming Meets Online Dispute Resolution, 15 AM. REV. INT'L
ARB. 337, 357-58 (2004) (citing studies).
28. See Speer, supra note 27 (describing "secure customers" as "those who feel great
satisfaction with a store [and] would recommend it to others");. RINKE, supra note 25, at 138.
29. See generally PETE BLACKSHAW, SATISFIED CUSTOMERS TELL THREE FRIENDS, ANGRY
CUSTOMERS TELL 3,000: RUNNING A BUSINESS IN TODAY'S CONSUMER-DRIVEN WORLD 4-6
(2008) (noting how an upset customer posted a recording of his negative experience seeking to
cancel AOL service on the Internet, thereby spreading his complaint to at least 62,827 others);
New ways to complain, CONSUMERREPORTS.ORG, http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/money/co
nsumer-protection/new-ways-to-complain/overview/index.htm, [http://perma.ce/W78T-W352]
(last visited Jan. 12, 2014) (illustrating examples of consumers who used social media to
complain or praise a company and its effects on the company).
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track records to the top of its ratings for all shoppers to see when making
purchasing decisions on the popular sales site."
That said, businesses have become less generous in providing contract
changes in B2C contracts, and many companies include unilateral
amendment provisions in their form contracts that hinder consumers'
incentive to shop for or negotiate form contracts. It is rational for
consumers to forego the investment of time to negotiate terms ex ante
knowing that companies can change the terms ex post.32  Furthermore,
companies use mass mailings or confusing online presentations (aka
"shrouding") to slip provisions into form contracts, thereby leaving
consumers without notice of onerous provisions they rationally should seek
to avoid or change.33
Businesses also have begun to cut off assistance to overly squeaky
wheels. They may track customer complaints or product returns in order to
build lists of those they deem unworthy of future assistance. 34 This is fair
to the extent it prevents fraud, but it is problematic when it results in denial
of legitimate complaints." Furthermore, companies have become reluctant
to help consumers for fear that they will waive future insistence on
warranty and other remedy limitations.36
Still, businesses overall have incentive to assist only the squeakiest
wheels. As noted, appeased customers often are the most loyal and
dissatisfied complainers are usually the most vocal on social media.3 7
Furthermore, the squeaky wheels tend to be the same individuals who
already harness the greatest power and resources. This, in turn, perpetuates
30. See Look For This New Seal to find items from sellers with the best services, EBAY,
http://pages.ebay.com/topratedplus/index.html, [http://perma.cc/T98H-X54K] (last visited Jan.
20, 2014) (illustrating the criteria for finding the top rated sellers on eBay).
31. See David Horton, Flipping the Script: Contra Proferentem and Standard Form
Contracts, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 431, 478-80 (2009).
32. David Horton, The Shadow Terms: Contract Procedure and Unilateral Amendments, 57
UCLA L. REv. 605, 648-52 (2010) (explaining the inefficiency and anti-bargaining effects of
unilateral amendment provisions).
33. See generally Alces & Hopkins, supra note 10, at 889-903 (discussing "shrouding").
34. See RICHARD K. MILLER & KELLI WASHINGTON, CONSUMER MARKETING 160-62
(2009).
35. See Press Release, National Retail Federation, Retailers Find Balance As Return Policies
Assist Honest Shoppers, Fight Fraud (Oct. 29, 2009), available at https://www.nrf.com/modules.
php?name=News&op-viewlive&sp-id=814, [http://perma.cc/8UNF-UABS] (stating that return
policy fraud have cost retailers an estimated $9.6 billion in 2009 alone).
36. See, e.g., Buffalo Molded Plastics, Inc. v. Omega Tool Corp., 344 B.R. 394, 407 (Bankr.
W.D. Pa. 2006) (finding company could not rely on payment terms in the applicable contract
because they were not followed in the industry).
37. Speer, supra note 27, at 13 (noting how complaining customers are those most likely to
remain loyal and recommend a business to others if it satisfies the complaints).
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contractual discrimination and widens the gap between the consumer
"haves" and "have-nots."
B. CONSUMERS' RELUCTANCE TO PURSUE REMEDIES FOR PURCHASE
COMPLAINTS
Consumers suffer from irrationality and inertia in the marketplace.
They do not necessarily make purchases based on considered economic
cost/benefit comparisons, and are prone to ignore contract terms when
reading them would require action such as clicking a link on a website or
sifting through fine print stuffed in a mailing. They also are susceptible to
confusing or erroneous marketing, which companies may use to shroud
onerous terms. These contracting realities are contrary to classical
economists' assumptions that individuals make rational purchases based on
perfect information about those purchases."
Real world contracting is messy. Indeed, most individuals do not
read or digest the often long and complex form contracts that have become
the norm in B2C exchanges.39 Consumers also may make economically
irrational contract choices due to over-optimism, sunk-cost effect, cognitive
dissonance, and confirmation bias. 40 Deeper discussion of these behavioral
and psychological tendencies is beyond the scope of this essay, but
essentially such tendencies work in concert to blind consumers from
potential problems with their contracts. This is because consumers are
optimistic at the time they make purchases, and they do not want to believe
they made bad decisions when problems arise. Individuals also are prone
to overlook red flags and continue with contracts after investing time and
38. See Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in
Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 307-22 (discussing how cognitive biases can lead to the
dismissal of information); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1203, 1204-06, 1222-25, 1243-44 (2003) (discussing law-
and-economics' assumptions regarding consumer rationality).
39. See Debra Pogrund Star & Jessica M. Choplin, A Cognitive and Social Psychological
Analysis of Disclosure Laws and Call for Mortgage Counseling to Prevent Predatory Lending, 16
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 85, 98-99 (2010) (noting examples of certain normally overlooked
terms, including adjustable rates versus fixed rates on loan agreements).
40. See id. at 100-01 (discussing "anchoring effects"); see also Shmuel 1. Becher,
Behavioral Science and Consumer Standard Form Contracts, 68 LA. L. REV. 117, 122-24 (2007)
(explaining behavioral law and economics basics); Russell Korobkin, Symposium, Inertia and
Preference in Contract Negotiation: The Psychological Power of Default Rules and Form Terms,
51 VAND. L. REv. 1583, 1605-09, 1627 (1998) (noting individuals' "tunnel vision" skewed by
their biases). But see Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law,
50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1559-75 (1998) (critiquing behavioral law and economics as merely a
psychological and sociological account of human behavior that "confuse[s] explanation and
prediction" and lacks "theoretical ambition").
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resources in making a purchasing decision.4 1 For example, car salespersons
know that consumers are prone to buy a car after taking a test drive and
beginning the notoriously exhausting negotiating process that often
accompanies such purchases. It is tough to walk away.
Humans also are lazy, or inert, when it comes to contracting. This
means that individuals are prone to accept preprinted terms and skim
contracts merely to confirm assumptions or salespersons' promises instead
of carefully considering contract terms.4 2  Similarly, this means that
consumers are slow to assert complaints if it requires efforts such as hiring
an attorney and filing a claim in court or with an arbitration association.
Consumers also are hindered by remedy limitations and arbitration
procedures that require them to deposit high filing and administrative
fees.43 It is quite rational for consumers to forgo filing a claim when the
costs of filing such a claim outweigh any potential remedy.
Individuals also lack the time, money, knowledge, and patience to
pursue complex or difficult remedy processes. People busy with work and
family obligations are likely to give up in pursuing complaints when
companies ignore their initial requests for assistance." Anger may fuel a
consumer's initial e-mail or phone call regarding a purchase problem, but
consumers generally do not follow up after receiving no reply or lingering
on hold with customer service phone lines.45 Customer service
representatives also may make it very unpleasant or stressful for consumers
to obtain redress.
For example, one law student reported that when he called customer
support to contest -charges for a "free" credit report from
www.freecreditreport.com, the representative insisted that he signed up for
a paid subscription for credit monitoring when he submitted his
information to obtain an ostensibly free report. 46 The law student was quite
persistent and withstood a lengthy "tug-of-war." Nonetheless, his
41. See generally Best & Andreasen, supra note 3, at 703-10 (noting possible responses to
perceived purchase problems).
42. See generally Joshua Klayman & Young-Won Ha, Confirmation, Disconfirmation, and
Information in Hypothesis Testing, 94 PSYCHOL. REV. 211 (1987) (discussing confirmation bias).
43. See Cruz & Hinck, supra note 5, at 674-76.
44. See Best & Andreasen, supra note 3, at 715 (commenting on how complexity in the
consumer complaint process is related to the likelihood that a consumer will complain).
45. See id.
46. Memorandum from Nathan E. Vassar, Graduate, University of Texas School of Law, to
author (Apr. 26, 2010) (on file with author) (documenting his experience with
http://www.freecreditreport.com, [http://perma.cc/HUK5-D9NS]); see also E-mail from David
Horton, Assoc. Professor, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, to author (Sept. 3, 2010, 16:46
MST) (on file with author) (reporting a similar story).
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persistence only earned cancellation, leaving him liable for the initial
subscription charge to avoid additional hassle.47  Although he felt
defrauded, he knew that it would not be worth it to endure the costs of
filing a court or arbitration action for such a small dollar claim, both in
terms of time and money.
Societal influences also quell consumer complaints and abilities to get
remedies on their claims. Although we hear in the media that Americans
are adversarial or litigious, that is generally not true among the general
public. Instead, culture teaches individuals to maintain a stiff upper lip.48
Furthermore, women may be especially reluctant to assert complaints or
pursue their economic interests, especially when they fear appearing
"pushy."49  Women also are much less likely than men to recognize
opportunities to negotiate and usually use less assertive language than men
when they do pursue negotiations.o This may contribute to women's less
lucrative outcomes in negotiations."
Similarly, research shows that black consumers are less likely than
white consumers to realize opportunities to complain or negotiate regarding
products and services.52 One study suggested that black consumers
generally have lower expectations regarding their purchases and thus do
not receive the same purchase benefits as white consumers.53 Furthermore,
conscious or subconscious biases may lead company representatives to
offer the least advantageous prices to racial minorities.54
47. Memorandum from Nathan E. Vasser to author, supra note 46 (consumer concluding: "I
ended up hassled and frustrated by the entire experience, as I had to pay for one month's
subscription, and endured a lengthy and difficult phone conversation in order to release myself
from the automatic monthly charge.").
48. See Alice F. Stuhlmacher & Amy E. Walters, Gender Diferences in Negotiation
Outcome: A Meta-Analysis, 52 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 653, 656 (1999).
49. See Charles B. Craver & David W. Barnes, Gender, Risk Taking, and Negotiation
Performance, 5 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 299, 309-10 (1999) (discussing gender in negotiations);
Laurie A. Rudman, Self-Promotion as a Risk Factor for Women: The Costs and Benefits of
Counterstereotypical Impression Management, 74 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 629,
629-30 (1998) (explaining societal expectations that women should remain more relational and
less confrontational).
50. LINDA BABCOCK & SARA LASCHEVER, WOMEN DON'T ASK: NEGOTIATION AND THE
GENDER DIVIDE 20 (2003) (noting how women were 45% more likely to score low on a rating
scale assessing whether people saw their situations as open to change via negotiations);
Stuhlmacher & Walters, supra note 48, at 653-77 (reviewing findings from studies on gender in
negotiations).
51. See Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Deborah Small, Negotiating Divorce: Gender and the
Behavioral Economics of Divorce Bargaining, 26 LAW & INEQ. 109, 117-21, 124-26 (2008)
(discussing research regarding gender in negotiations).
52. Best & Andreasen, supra note 3, at 707, 723-24 (reporting study findings).
53. Id. at 707.
54. See Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car
2014]1 531
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Research in lending contexts also indicates that company
representatives provide the best deals to white male consumers.55  In
December 2013, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ("CFPB") and
the Department of Justice ("DOJ") ordered Ally Financial Inc., to pay $80
million in damages as part of a settlement for claims of discriminatory
lending from the bank's indirect auto lending program.56  Evidence
indicated that Ally's indirect financing program-involving more than
12,000 car dealerships around the country-charged approximately
235,000 African-American, Hispanic, and Asian/Pacific Islander borrowers
higher interest rates than non-Hispanic white borrowers. CFPB Director
Richard Cordray said, "[d]iscrimination is a serious issue across every
consumer credit market."58
Companies also tailor their contract offerings and practices based on
"worthiness" predictions and consumer ratings. Data brokers gather not
only consumers' spending and debt histories, but also further details of
their financial, personal, and social networking behaviors. They even track
whether an individual uses a pen or pencil to fill out forms.59
These data brokers then may combine this information with
assumptions based on theory and predictions in order to create logarithmic
consumer "scores" or ratings, which they sell to companies in order to
drive how the companies treat different consumers. A consumer's "score"
may inform how a company will treat that individual when he or she calls
customer service or asks about the company's products and services.60
Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REV. 817, 819, 822-43 (1991) (noting others' animus-based theories
of discrimination and providing further detail regarding the research methodology and findings).
Professor Ayres found in his study of Chicago car sales that black consumers had to pay over
twice the markup paid by all other customers, regardless of market competition that should have
eliminated such discrimination. Id. at 819. Surprisingly, this was true although the car
dealerships steered the tester-buyers to salespersons who shared the buyers' gender and race
characteristics. Id.
55. See generally Press Release, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, CFPB and DOJ
Order Ally to Pay $80 Million to Consumers Harmed by Discriminatory Auto Loan Pricing,
(Dec. 20, 2013) available at http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/cfpb-and-doj-order-all
y-to-pay-80-million-to-consumers-harmed-by-discriminatory-auto-loan-pricing, [http://perma.cc/
D5YM-5MQQ] (noting that the Equal Credit Opportunity Act prohibits "creditors from
discriminating against loan applicants in credit transactions on the basis of characteristics such as




59. Nathalie Martin, Hey Dude, What's Your E-score, CREDIT SLIPS,
http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2012/08/hey-dude-whats-your-e-score.html, [http://perma.c
c/S9YC-TJ46] (last visited Jan. 20, 2014).
60. Natasha Singer, Secret E-Scores Chart Consumers' Buying Power, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18,
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What's more, these scores are largely secret and not regulated by the Fair
Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). 61  This means that companies may treat
consumers differently based on criteria and information that is unknown
and unappealable.
These scores are powerful and impossible to decode due to their
complex algorithms. Company representatives may use them in essentially
discriminating against consumers they deem less valuable. A New York
Times reporter observed:
A growing number of companies, including banks, credit and debit
card providers, insurers and online educational institutions are using
these scores to choose whom to woo on the Web. These scores can
determine whether someone is pitched a platinum credit card or a plain
one, a full-service cable plan or none at all. They can determine
whether a customer is routed promptly to an attentive service agent or
relegated to an overflow call center.62
These consumer scores thus augment the inequities of the SWS, and
create another discriminatory hurdle to obtaining remedies regarding B2C
purchases.
In sum, there is a confluence of corporate and consumer propensities
that work in concert to narrow access to remedies. Companies
understandably aim to satisfy the sophisticated customers who persistently
pursue their complaints, while consumers with the least time and resources
to learn about or advance their rights are left without remedies. At the
same time, behavioral tendencies and biases add to remedy rationing along
with new consumer scores that again work to the disadvantage of
consumers with lower status and less resources.
III. THE NEED FOR A "NEW HANDSHAKE" OPENING AVENUES
TO CONSUMER REMEDIES
Consumer remedy systems are faulty and skewed. The SWS impedes
market regulation by preventing informed consumers from alerting the
majority about purchase problems, and this converges with consumer
ratings to perpetuate contractual discrimination to the detriment of the least
informed and most vulnerable consumers. Lack of consumer information
2012), http://www.nytimes.cofm/2012/08/19/business/electronic-scores-rank-consumers-by-potent
ial-value.html?pagewanted=all&_r-0, [http://perma.cc/D4P5-KNC2]
61. Ed Mierzwinski & Jeff Chester, Symposium Selling Consumers, Not Lists: The New
World ofDigital Decision-making and the Role of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 46 SUFFOLK U.
L. REv. 845, 845-856 (2013).
62. Singer, supra note 60.
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about available rights and remedies also impedes regulators' awareness of
company improprieties, and thus thwarts consumer protections.
A. BROKEN MARKET
Classical and economic theories posit that strict contract enforcement
results in optimal allocation of resources, assuming that rational consumers
will buy the optimal quality and quantity of goods and services under
competitive terms. In reality, however, most consumers do not have
perfect information about the market and do not read or understand the
complicated terms commonly in form contracts. Consumers therefore fail
to purchase optimal quantities or bargain for competitive and efficient
terms. 64  This, in turn, leaves companies free to take advantage of
consumers' lack of information and bargaining power. The market
therefore fails to police the fairness or efficiency of consumer contracts.
Furthermore, evidence does not indicate that theorists' so-called
"informed minority" is policing the fairness of contracts for the uninformed
majority in the B2C market. Market defenders argue that regardless of
whether most consumers read or bargain for efficient terms, a sufficiently
knowledgeable and noisy "informed minority" will force companies to
cater their contracts to appease those consumers who read contracts and
spread negative information about company practices. 66 Accordingly, the
informed minority of consumers will speak up for the uninformed masses
to police merchants' contract terms.
Data nonetheless casts doubt on the existence of this "informed
minority." For example, researchers who studied consumers' internet
browsing behavior on sixty-six online software companies' websites found
that only one or two out of one thousand shoppers on these sites actually
accessed the companies' standard form contracts (referred to as end-user
software license agreements, or "EULAs"). 67 Furthermore, they found that
shoppers rarely accessed product reviews or other substitute information
sources.68
63. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3-28 (4th ed. 1992)
(explaining the economic model and the usefulness of economic theory in analyzing law).
64. See generally Cruz & Hinck, supra note 5, at 635-71 (explaining the various arguments).
65. See generally id. at 646-71.
66. Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 8, at 637-39 (discussing this theory); see Cruz & Hinck,
supra note 5, at 646.
67. See Bakos et al., supra note 9, at 15-17, 33-37.
68. Id. at 34.
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Similarly, research suggests the unlikelihood that a sufficient number
of proactive consumers will regulate merchant practices by spreading
information and taking action ex post regarding purchase problems.69 One
European study found that only 7% of consumer cases ended with a
resolution in court or an alternative proceeding.70 The researchers also
found that 45% of launched complaints ended with no agreement or
decision, suggesting that consumers who took initial action on their
complaints nonetheless gave up their pursuits along the way.n Of course,
some complaints lack merit. Still, this seems to indicate that even initially
proactive consumers are prone to "give up the fight."
Furthermore, most consumers remain uninformed regarding their
contract rights due to the high costs of obtaining information and pursing
contract claims.72 In addition, advertising and disclosure laws generally fail
to correct for imperfect information, and even well-meaning disclosure
rules may backfire by adding to the information overload that already
clouds consumers' comprehension of their contracts. In a Consumer
Reports survey, only 16% of the nearly two-thirds of respondents who
claimed that they read all of the disclosures regarding a new loan or credit
card said they found the disclosures understandable. 74 A typical consumer
may have to spend nearly three hours weeding through lengthy terms and
conditions in a car purchase agreement.
Companies also have become notorious for using especially
complicated fine print in their form contracts and teaser promotions to
"shroud," or mask, the true costs of contracts.76 For example, lenders may
sneak add-ons for credit insurance into loan documents in ways that elude
69. See Marco B.M. Loos, Individual Private Enforcement of Consumer Rights in Civil
Courts in Europe, 5-14 (Ctr. for the Study of Eur. Contract Law Working Paper Series, Paper
No. 2010/01), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1535819, [http://perma.cc/96BX-6XJM]
(discussing the need for reform to increase consumers' private enforcement of European contract
regulations).
70. Id. at 4.
7 1. Id.
72. See id. at 3.
73. See Star & Choplin, supra note 39, at 86-95, 113-26 (discussing the inability of
disclosure laws to protect consumers from predatory lending).
74. No more fine-print surprises, CONSUMER REPS.: MONEY ADVISER, Feb. 2011, at 2
(noting survey results).
75. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure 7-20,
40-55 (Chi. Law Sch. John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper, 2d Series, Paper No. 516,
2010), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/file/516-obs-disclosure.pdf, [http://perma.c
c/ZVW7-UKAW].
76. See Alces & Hopkins, supra note 10, at 889-893 (discussing "shrouding").
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even the most educated consumers." In addition, some companies use the
SWS to manipulate more formal complaint resolution processes and keep
the majority of consumers unaware of their potential rights. This also
allows merchants to keep claims out of the public eye and further limit their
provision of remedies. For example, one credit card issuer that
inexplicably raised all of its customers' interest rates by two percent
apologized and rescinded the rate increase for only the few customers who
complained, while the rest of the consumers continued to pay the increased
rates.79
Complaints systems therefore become skewed in favor of the most
sophisticated consumers who know how to artfully submit complaints and
get what they want. These consumers then have little to no incentive to
alert the majority about available remedies. They may be "complicit in the
exploitation of the myopic because the welfare loss that is born by the
myopic redounds to the benefit of the sophisticated."" This is because
companies have more resources for assisting the sophisticated consumers
when they continue to profit from imposing onerous terms on the consumer
masses.
At the same time, there is no reason to believe that any sort of
informed minority has the same purchase interests and needs as the
majority. Indeed, consumers have different needs and complaints."
Accordingly, remedy systems must be contextualized to account for
consumers' differences.
B. CONTRACTUAL DISCRIMINATION
Most consumers feel powerless when seeking remedies regarding
their purchases.82 For example, this is true in the cellular service market,
77. See also Star & Choplin, supra note 39, at 90-95 (explaining the various predatory
practices that are difficult for consumers to understand or digest).
78. See Best & Andreasen, supra note 3, at 710-17; Cruz & Hinck, supra note 5, at 673-75.
79. Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 22
(2008) (discussing how companies appease only those who complain, while leaving the masses in
the dark regarding their potential rights).
80. Alces & Hopkins, supra note 10, at 890.
81. See generally Morris B. Holbrook & Elizabeth C. Hirschman, The Experiential Aspects
of Consumption: Consumer Fantasies, Feelings, and Fun, 9 J. CONSUMER RES. 132 (1982)
(discussing the many factors that affect buyer behavior and calling for more research of those
considerations); William H. Redmond, Consumer Rationality and Consumer Sovereignty, 58
REV. Soc. ECON. 177 (2000) (discussing how consumer choice is a prime example of suboptimal
decision-making).
82. See Larry Bates, Administrative Regulation of Terms in Form Contracts: A Comparative
Analysis of Consumer Protection, 16 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 1, 29-33 (2002).
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which is dominated by relatively few companies.1 In addition, sellers may
use their power to capitalize on consumers' over-confidence regarding their
purchases and failures to properly weigh and consider contract risks and
information.8 4 They also may manipulate the SWS to suppress information
sharing among consumers and hinder consumers' pursuit of contract
claims. They quiet the sophisticated squeaky wheels, and they usually are
especially successful in curbing complaints from consumers with low
socioeconomic status or claims that involve personal judgment or low-cost
items.85
Consumers with higher incomes and more education thus end up on
top in a consumer caste system. The squeaky wheels tend to have higher
quality and service expectations.86 They also generally are more confident
and thus more successful in pursuing remedies when dissatisfied with their
purchases.8  One study indicated that "for every 1,000 purchases,
households in the highest status category voice complaints concerning 98.9
purchases, while households in the lowest status category voice complaints
concerning 60.7 purchases."
This differential may be due to lack of educations and resources,
along with lower expectations regarding their purchases. Consumers who
are most vulnerable to feelings of powerlessness often become accustomed
to poor treatment and have lower expectations regarding purchases.89
Lower status consumers also are likely to have less confidence and fewer
resources with which to assert their complaints. They also often lack
financial education and may face hurdles created by limited English
proficiency."
83. See Adi Ayal, Harmful Freedom of Choice: Lessons from the Cellphone Market, 74 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 91, 91-100 (2011) (discussing how cell phone companies use complexity to
take advantage of the consumer); Oren Bar-Gill & Rebecca Stone, Mobile Misperceptions, 23
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 49, 118 (2009) (noting how power plays a role in cellular service contracts
"designed to exploit the cognitive biases of many consumers").
84. Becher, supra note 40, at 136-78 (discussing consumers' failure to properly assess low-
probability risks and the likelihood of future incidents).
85. Best & Andreasen, supra note 3, at 730.
86. See Bilrd Tronvoll, Complainer Characteristics When Exit is Closed, 18 INT'L J. OF
SERVICE INDUSTRY MGMT 25, 25-51 (2007), available at www.emeraldinsight.com/0956-4233.h
tm, [http://perma.cc/3MDX-89P4] (discussing research regarding characteristics of consumers
who complain about their purchases).
87. See id. at 32-33.
88. Amy J. Schmitz, supra note I at 213 (quoting Arthur Best & Alan R. Andreasen,
Consumer Response to Unsatisfactory Purchases: A Survey of Perceiving Defects, Voicing
Complaints, and Obtaining Redress, 11 L. & SOC'Y REV. 701, 723 (1977)).
89. Tronvoll, supra note 86, at 25-36.
90. U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-518, FACTORS AFFECTING THE
FINANCIAL LITERACY OF INDIVIDUALS WITH LIMITED ENGLISH PROFICIENCY 1, 9-10 (2010),
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To be fair, no assumptions or research applies for all consumers.
Indeed, there are studies suggesting that the price of the purchase, the
probability of winning the complaint, and the frequency of the purchase
type overshadow demographics in predicting the likelihood of complaints.9 1
Nonetheless, data suggests a growing divide between the high-power
"haves" and low-power "have-nots" based on income, education, and age.
Furthermore, stereotypes and biases may augment this divide. As
noted, customer service associates' conscious and subconscious biases may
affect how they treat consumers, and lead them to offer the worst deals to
minorities and women. 92 Consumers also may perpetuate their low-power
status by assuming that they will be unfairly judged or brushed aside.93 The
more concerned a consumer is about affirming negative labels, the greater
the likelihood that she will feel constrained in her communications.94
Contractual discrimination also may result from data brokers'
valuations or consumer scoring.95 These scores and ratings favor higher-
income consumers with more education, and thus the same class of
sophisticated consumers who are more likely to pursue their complaints
and obtain remedies in the SWS. This again deepens the divide between
consumer "haves" and "have-nots." 6
C. REGULATION AVOIDANCE
Very few consumers take their complaints to court or to public
regulators. This is due in part to companies' use of the SWS to control
complaint resolution and quiet the squeaky wheels who have the requisite
resources and confidence to pursue such processes." Some companies
strategically offer settlements and remedies to would-be plaintiffs to
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/dl0518.pdf, [http://perma.cc/KJZ7-G7GZ] (reporting
the extent to which limited English proficiency-along with income and education-impact
financial education, and the ability to make informed judgments and take effective actions
regarding contracts and money management).
91. See Speer, supra note 27, at 13-14 (noting mixed evidence).
92. See DIMATrEO ET AL., supra note 9, at 237-40 (noting biases and discrimination).
93. Cf Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Conversations at Work, 79 OR. L. REv. 103, 108-
10 (2000) (discussing how minority employees may refrain from complaining due to stereotype
concerns).
94. Cf id. at 109-22, 133-39.
95. See Martin, supra note 59 (discussing consumer scoring).
96. See Horton, supra note 32, at 605-09 (noting how contract adherents have no reason to
expend time and resources shopping for terms that companies may unilaterally change, while
companies feel no pressure to change form procedural terms to suit adherents' preferences).
97. Best & Andreasen, supra note 3, at 728-29.
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preclude class actions.98 Furthermore, class action waivers and arbitration
clauses increasingly cut off consumers' access to class relief. These forces
work in concert to stifle enforcement of consumer protections, especially
with respect to small claims that consumers cannot economically assert
through individual actions.99
A somewhat notorious example is Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc.'oo In
that case, Gateway offered to waive a contractual thirty-day return limit
and give the Hills a full refund as a means for stopping the Hills from
leading a class action regarding Gateway computer problems.
Furthermore, the court ordered the Hills to arbitrate their claims
individually due to an arbitration clause. Accordingly, the SWS and an
arbitration clause were at play to thwart the Hill's public lawsuits on the
merits of the warranty dispute, thereby hindering development of the law
and leaving most consumers uninformed and perhaps without redress
regarding computer defects.'0o
Both the SWS and arbitration privatize dispute resolution and limit
public access to information regarding faulty products and company
improprieties.102
Although private settlements can be beneficial, public action or
reporting often is necessary to uncover product recalls and inform the
masses about companies' malfeasance.10 3 Consumer Reports found in its
2010 survey that less than a quarter of the respondents said they researched
product recalls, and only a fifth of the respondents were aware of recalls
98. Eugene J. Kelley, Jr. et al., Offers of Judgment in Class Action Cases: Do Defendants
Have a Secret Weapon?, 54 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 283, 283 (2000); David Hill Koysza,
Preventing Defendants from Mooting Class Actions by Picking Off Named Plaintiffs, 53 DUKE
L.J. 781, 789 (2003).
99. See Jeffrey 1. Shinder, In Praise of Class Actions, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 5, 2010, at 39
(highlighting how class actions give voice to "little guy" consumers who have been wronged).
100. Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997); Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling
Contracts as an Agency Problem, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 679, 707 (discussing the Hill v. Gateway).
101. Hill, 105 F.3dat 1150-51.
102. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, Opting In or Opting Out: The New Legal Process or
Arbitration, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1087, 1093-97 (1999) (noting how public litigation can stimulate
legal development and public debate through recorded opinions).
103. Ijfy Product? Now a Way to Tell, CONSUMERREPORTS.ORG (Feb. 2011),
http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/magazine-archive/201 1/february/recalls-and-safety-alerts/iff
y-product/index.htm, [http://perma.cc/H72X-QJ2Q] [hereinafter Iffy Product] (highlighting the
difficulties of obtaining information regarding complaints and companies' power in blocking
information); Trouble with Recalls CONSUMERREPORTS.ORG (Feb. 2011),
http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/magazine-archive/2011/february/home-garden/bad-products/
recalls/index.htm, [http://perma.cc/RQ9G-5SBU] (advising consumers to register products to
receive recall information).
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regarding products they had purchased in the past three years.104
Furthermore, "an additional 15 percent simply threw the product in the
trash rather than returning it for a refund, an exchange, or a free repair."os
Hopefully, online processes through the Consumer Product Safety
Commission ("CPSC") database that launched in March 2011 will help
consumers with product problems-but even such a database may prove
ineffective if consumers do not know of its existence or the processes do
not provide concrete remedies.' 6
IV. A "NEW HANDSHAKE" TO OPEN AVENUES TO CONSUMER
REMEDIES
Ad hoc management of squeaky wheels, data brokers' consumer
scoring, class action waivers, and onerous arbitration clauses have all
contributed to narrowed access to consumer remedies in B2C transactions.
At the same time, traditional face-to-face ("F2F") dispute resolution
processes are generally too expensive and time-consuming for typical
consumer disputes. This is especially true for low status consumers and
small claims. Nonetheless, computer-mediated communication ("CMC")
creates new ways to connect. Individuals date online, so it seems rational
to resolve disputes online.'07 Indeed, the efficiencies of ODR open avenues
for affordable access to justice that the F2F legal system cannot provide.
ODR has the potential to hold companies accountable and create the "New
Handshake" of the digital age if it is efficient and fair for companies and all
consumers-regardless of wealth, education, race, or age. 08
104. See Many miss out, supra note 11.
105. Id.
106. Ijfy Product, supra note 103 (discussing the new database and other technology upgrades
contemplated by the CPSC).
107. See Amy J. Schmitz, "Drive-Thru" Arbitration in the Digital Age: Empowering
Consumers Through Binding ODR, 62 BAYLOR L. REv. 178, 180-240 (2010); see also Llewellyn
Joseph Gibbons, Creating a Market for Justice: a Market Incentive Solution to Regulating the
Playing Field: Judicial Deference, Judicial Review, Due Process, and Fair Play in Online
Consumer Arbitration, 23 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 1, 3 (2002).
108. See Philippe Gillibron, From Face-to-Face to Screen-to-Screen: Real Hope or True
Fallacy?, 23 OHIO ST. J. DIsp. RESOL. 301, 308-10 (2008); Haitham A. Haloush & Bashar H.
Malkawi, Internet Characteristics and Online Alternative Dispute Resolution, 13 HARV. NEGOT.
L. REV. 327, 328 (2008); Schmitz, supra note 107, at 239-42.
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A. MOTIVATIONS FOR MOVING CONSUMER COMPLAINT PROCESSES
ONLINE
CMC and virtual communications mechanisms have created new
means for individuals to connect.109  Young and old alike now
communicate through text messages instead of telephone calls, and
socialize through chat rooms, blogs, and networks like Facebook and
Twitter." 0  Handwritten letters and personal phone calls are rare.
Nonetheless, online communication can also breed relational isolation,
diminished creativity, and increased deception."' Accordingly, ODR
designed to provide a "New Handshake" online must carefully draw on the
best attributes of online communications while seeking to minimize the
concerning consequences of lost F2F intimacy.
1. Drawbacks of CMC
Consumers increasingly lament the increasing lack of customer
service and inability to reach live representatives with respect to their
purchase problems. We all know how frustrating it can be to call
companies' "customer service" numbers. Companies place us on endless
telephone holds, drop our calls, and transfer us to numerous departments
before ultimately connecting our phone calls with representatives who may
not even have capacity or power to handle our concerns.1 2 It is no wonder
that most consumers give up on complaints and do not become the squeaky
wheels who obtain remedies.
Companies nonetheless suggest that consumers should reach them
online by e-mail or live chat in order to obtain redress. Such processes can
be beneficial when they work, but some companies ignore e-mails or send
automated replies that again lead consumers to give up pursuit of their
complaints."' Furthermore, companies also may use e-contracting to
impose form contracts that preserve their power to change contract
provisions, and then continually modify the terms ex post through e-mails
109. See generally Nicole Gabrielle Kravec, Dogmas of Online Dispute Resolution, 38 U.
TOL. L. REv. 125 (2006).
110. See Betsy Israel, The Overconnecteds, N.Y. TIMES BLOG (Nov. 5, 2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/ll/05/education/edlife/connect.html?sp=l&sq=The+Overconnect
eds&st-nyt, [http://perma.cc/UH3M-2EWJ].
111. Kravec, supra note 109, at 125-140 (discussing internet communications for ODR).
112. See Sheri Carder & Larry Gunter, Can You Hear Me? Corporate America's
Communication with Dissatisfied Customers, 24 J. AM. & COMP. CULTURES 109, 110 (2001)
(noting lack of adequate customer assistance through telephone calls).
113. Id.
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and website postings.114
Online communications also can be especially nasty or offensive due
to the lack of intimacy and the relative anonymity of communicating
through a computer, cell phone, or other device."' This anonymity also
allows for "cyber bullying" and use of abusive or combative language one
would not feel comfortable using in person or on the phone."16
Negotiations online may become overly aggressive due to the social and
physical distance created through CMC."7  CMC also may diminish
empathy and foster misinterpretations."' That said, individuals have
become increasingly adept at expressing themselves through standardized
textual cues and emotive characters and short-hands over time.' '9
2. Overriding Benefits of CMC for Consumer Claims Resolution
Despite CMC's drawbacks, there is no question that it is here to stay.
Most agree that its pros outweigh its cons. Companies enjoy efficiencies of
online contracting and communications in B2C commerce, and they may
pass on savings to consumers through lower prices and higher quality
goods and services.12 Consumers also enjoy managing accounts, paying
bills, and communicating with companies online with relatively little cost
or time. Many companies also are more responsive to complaints posted
on social media and requests sent through e-mails or website chat systems
than they are to phone calls or letters.' 2' Online case management enables
114. See Mark E. Budnitz, The Development of Consumer Protection Law, The
Institutionalization of Consumerism, and Future Prospects and Perils, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
1147, 1169-81 (2010) (discussing dangers of online contracts subject to modification).
115. See Kravec, supra note 109, at 125-30 (noting loss of social connections and contextual
cues online).
116. Jan Hoffman, Online Bullies Pull Schools into the Fray, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/28/style/28bully.html?emc+etal&pagewanted-print, [http://per
ma.cc/38G9-36Y4] ("It's easier to fight online, because you feel more brave and in control ...
117. JARON LANIER, YOU ARE NOT A GADGET: A MANIFESTO 60-63 (2010) (noting the anti-
human approach fostered by the expansion of internet life).
118. Id. (discussing dehumanizing impacts of the internet). For example, "LOL" can be
interpreted as "lots of love" or "lots of laughs"-which could make for awkward interactions if
used in reply to news that a friend's loved one passed away.
119. See, e.g., Robert M. Bastress & Joseph D. Harbaugh, Taking the Lawyer's Craft into
Virtual Space: Computer-Mediated Interviewing, Counseling, and Negotiating, 10 CLINICAL L.
REV. 115, 118-26 (2003) (detailing the trends of increased use of CMC).
120. See Shmuel I. Becher & Tal Z. Zarsky, E-Contract Doctrine 2.0: Standard Form
Contracting in the Age of Online User Participation, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV.
303, 309-10 (2008) (noting ways that online standard form contracts save time and money).
121. See Judy Strauss & Donna J. Hill, Consumer Complaints by E-mail: An Exploratory
Investigation of Corporate Responses and Customer Reactions, 15 J. INTERACTIVE MKTG. 63,
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merchants to prioritize cases and respond en masse to certain issues,
thereby significantly improving communication efficiencies.
The relative anonymity and comfort of communicating through a
computer or smartphone also may ease some of the social and power
pressures of F2F communications.122 This is especially true for consumers
who fear stereotypes or biases based on appearance.123 In addition, some
individuals are less adversarial online than in-person when the
asynchronous nature gives them space to "take a deep breath" and dissipate
anger before replying. Individuals also may be more cautious in
composing e-mails due to awareness that their messages are easily
retrievable.124  At the same time, CMC has become less sterile as
individuals have developed means for virtually building rapport over the
internet. 125
The internet also provides a treasure trove for consumers to research
purchases and share information about products and services.126  Online
forums allow consumers to share information not only about the quality of
what they purchased, but also about means for reaching customer service
and obtaining remedies. For example, Utility Consumers Action Network
("UCAN") provides an online forum for consumers to alert others
regarding contract dangers and to offer suggestions for avoiding or
responding to consumer issues.127  Websites also have become portals for
63-64 (2001); Customer Complaint Behaviour, QUEENSLAND GOV'T, http://www.business.qld.g
ov.au/business/running/customer-service/managing-customer-complaints/customer-complaint-be
haviour, [http://perma.cc/P3TP-KC7P] (last visited Jan. 12, 2014).
122. See Paul Stylianou, Online Dispute Resolution: The Case for a Treaty Between the
United States and the European Union in Resolving Cross-Border E-Commerce Disputes, 36
SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 117, 125 (2008) (recognizing emotion involved with F2F
communications).
123. See id. at 125-26 (noting benefits and drawbacks of online dispute resolution processes).
124. See Susan C. Herring, Computer-Mediated Communication on the Internet, 36 ANN.
REv. INFO. SC. & TECH. 109, 144-45 (2002); David Allen Larson & Paula Gajewski Mickelson,
Technology Mediated Dispute Resolution Can Improve the Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf
Ethical Practices System: The Deaf Community Is Well Prepared and Can Lead by Example, 10
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 131, 140-41 (2008) (explaining evidence that less bullying occurs
through online communication than F2F).
125. David Allen Larson & Paula Gajewski Mickelson, Technology Mediated Dispute
Resolution and the Deaf Community, 3 HEALTH L. & POL'Y BRIEF 15, 18 (2009), available at
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgiarticle=1091&context-hlp, [http://
perma.cc/HC43-9R5A] (noting how "[t]echnology can protect parties from uncomfortable or
threatening face-to-face confrontations and offer vulnerable individuals a place where their
communications can appear as forceful as the statements of someone who is physically much
larger and louder," although it also creates risks for cyber bullying).
126. See Budnitz, supra note 114, at 1180; Gibbons, supra note 107, at 3.
127. See UCAN: UTILITY CONSUMERS' ACTION NETWORK, http://www.ucan.org,
[http://perma.cc/69DB-73PP] (last visited Jan. 1, 2014).
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formalized ODR, such as online mediation, arbitration, and other
settlement processes that utilize messaging systems, e-mails, and other
CMC.128 They also enable consumers to share information around how to
get their claims heard, which merchants are responsive and which are not,
and share data around product defects and solutions.
Key benefits of ODR systems include their speed, low costs, and
allowance for both asynchronous communications and real-time
dialogue. 129  These systems also are more convenient than F2F dispute
resolution processes.130 Furthermore, ODR is expanding globally due to its
ability to transcend borders and escape the legal constraints of other
processes for resolution of international disputes.13 '
Given ODR's benefits, why has it not become the norm? This is
perplexing as the European Union and other international communities
embrace ODR. The problem is that many distrust online systems in the
wake of rampant internet security breaches, and most consumers are
unaware of the ODR processes currently in existence. For example, the
social networking website Facebook has implemented an ODR mechanism
through TRUSTe for resolution of consumers' privacy disputes.13 2
However, unscientific polling suggests that consumers generally know
nothing about these ODR rules or other remedies regarding privacy rights
on Facebook.133 This is due in part to the fact that information about their
128. Am. Bar Ass'n's Task Force on Elec. Commerce & Alt. Dispute Resolution, Addressing
Disputes in Electronic Commerce: Final Recommendations and Report, 58 BuS. L. 415, 419
(2002) [hereinafter ABA 2002 Report] (defining ODR broadly).
129. See Gillibron, supra note 108, at 312-15.
130. See generally Public Roundtable on Dispute Resolution for Online Business-to-
Consumer Contracts, 66 Fed. Reg. 7491-03, 7491-92 (2001); Public Workshop: Alternative
Dispute Resolution for Consumer Transactions in the Borderless Online Marketplace, 65 Fed.
Reg. 7831-01, 7831-32 (2000).
131. See, e.g., More More More: CPR Meeting Highlights, 27 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST
LITIG. 125, 127-28 (2009) (highlighting technology and ODR as key elements in the future of
dispute resolution).
132. See John Gamble, Facebook & TRUSTe, TRUSTE BLOG (May 12, 2010),
http://www.truste.com/blog/2010/05/12/facebook-truste/, [http://perma.cc/Y98U-33DH] (noting
Facebook and TRUSTe's business relationship); see also Privacy Program Requirements,
TRUSTE, http://www.truste.com/privacy-program-requirements/, [http://perma.cc/ZXW3-
CDRG] (last visited Mar. 1, 2014); TRUSTe Dispute Resolution Services, TRUSTE, http://www.tr
uste.com/products-and-services/dispute-resolution-services/, [http://perma.cc/LY6L-S5HR] (last
visited Mar. 1, 2014); TRUSTe Feedback and Resolution System, TRUSTE, https://feedback-
form.truste.com/watchdog/request, [http://perma.cc/4YNR-DMC9] (last visited Mar. 1, 2014).
133. See Memorandum from Heather Park, Research Assistant, to author (May 25, 2010) (on
file with author) (documenting and reporting an informal poll of users indicating that they did not
know about the eTrust online process for resolving privacy disputes against Facebook).
Admittedly, this was not a scientific or thorough survey, but it nonetheless shed light on common
Facebook users' awareness regarding this ODR process.
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rights is buried in fine print among the links on Facebook's site. Legal
workarounds and obfuscations create incentives for merchants to continue
to avoid creating effective redress processes.
B. SUGGESTED BEST PRACTICES FOR CONSUMER ODR
This proposal for a "New Handshake" does not advocate for "any
old" ODR. Instead, ODR processes must be designed to revive corporate
responsibility and consumer trust in their purchases. Processes therefore
must be transparent, user-friendly, and worth their costs in light of the
complexity and possible payout on the claims at issue.134 They also must
be secure and widely accessible, and consumers must have adequate
information about the ODR processes so that they know how to pursue
their rights online. Furthermore, satisfying ODR processes should be
backed by an enforcement mechanism to prevent promulgation of
meaningless awards.
Creation of such ODR processes could begin with creation of a
simple template that can be contextualized to meet needs of particular types
of disputes. For example, the template for resolution of consumers' claims
regarding online purchases could proceed as follows:
134. See Geoffrey Davies, Can Dispute Resolution Be Made Generally Available?, 12 OTAGO
L. REV. 305, 308-16 (2010).
Example Process for Consumers
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Consumers using this process could gain companies' attention on their
claims, and obtain remedies through a range of processes depending on
how a seller responds to an initial complaint. This tiered process may be
more satisfactory and productive than other traditional dispute resolution
procedures because it provides consumers with choices and systems
options on the way toward a final determination. It keeps the consumers in
control of their own solutions.
The process should nonetheless culminate with a binding award
(online arbitration, or what I term "OArb") if the parties do not reach a
settlement through online negotiations or mediation and voluntarily agree
to submit resulting disputes to an online arbitrator.135 Allowing for OArb
as the "last stop" in the process helps prevent parties from using delay
tactics to waylay resolution and thus access to remedies. Neither
companies nor consumers benefit from wasteful discussions, and they may
not take nonbinding processes seriously if the process will not end the
dispute. 136
This template also is unique because it adds a "trigger mechanism"
that allows for regulatory and consolidated actions where a sufficient
number of similar complaints are filed. This would be especially important
where multiple complaints indicate that health or safety issues are at stake.
For example, the trigger could alert the Federal Trade Commission
("FTC") when there is an inordinate amount of claims filed against one
manufacturer regarding a particular product that has caused multiple
injuries. Such a trigger would alert the public of the danger that may
otherwise remain private due to the SWS and would help address current
complaints regarding the privatization of statutory and other public policy
claims through traditional arbitration and class waivers.
Regulators also would benefit from notice through the trigger
mechanism regarding consumer protection issues because it would help
them determine when to pursue enforcement actions. For example,
135. See Schmitz, supra note 107, at 181-200 (discussing OArb). OArb differs from other
ODR because it results in a final third-party determination without the cost and stress of
traditional litigation. Id.
136. Id. at 193-94. See generally Colin Rule et al., Designing a Global Consumer Online
Dispute Resolution (ODR) System for Cross-Border Small Value-High Volume Claims-OAS
Developments, 42 UCC L.J. 221 (2010), available at http://colinrule.com/writing/ucclj.pdf,
[http://perma.cc/SEV4-SDHD] (discussing how to create a global system for resolving consumer
disputes and highlighting the United States' proposal for an ODR system). Full discussion of
ODR and OArb and means for expanding them in a measured manner is beyond the scope of this
essay but further discussion may be found in Schmitz, supra note 107 at 178-244 (proposing
prudent expansion).
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consumers have benefitted from the Federal Communications Commission
("FCC") learning about, and thus targeting, telecommunications
companies' adding third party charges to customers' bills, or "cramming."
This is especially true because these charges usually go unnoticed due to
consumers' lack of vigilance to their bill details and use of automatic and
online payments systems."' A trigger mechanism would alert the FCC
when there are an inordinate number of complaints against a company for
imposing these fees, thus providing fuel for the FCC to notify a company to
change its ways or face an enforcement action.
It seems at first blush that no company would agree to such a trigger
mechanism that could arouse regulatory action. However, the process
would greatly ease companies' dispute resolution costs and the allure of a
trustmark, as discussed below, would provide marketing benefits for
companies that agree to the process. Furthermore, companies' interest in
gaining goodwill and warding off full-blown enforcement actions and class
claims could foster companies' support for the process. Leaders of
companies may not even be aware of improprieties within their companies.
Moreover, it is far better for companies in terms of social, marketing, and
economic costs to receive regulatory notice and change corporate practices
than to endure enforcement actions, class actions, and multiple lawsuits.
Nonetheless, commitment to any ODR process must be voluntary and
properly regulated to ensure fairness and foster open-minded use of the
process.138  F2F arbitration has earned a poor reputation for curbing
consumer rights due to pro-business procedures and administration.13
"New Handshake" ODR must instead be balanced, fair, and efficient. 4 0
The online forms for filing claims should be user-friendly and guide
137. Press Release, Federal Communications Commission (FCC), FCC Proposes $5.2 Million
Fine Against U.S. Telecom Long Distance, Inc. for Deceptive Slamming, Cramming, and Billing
Practices (Jan. 24, 2014), available at http://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-proposes-52-m-fine-agai
nst-us-telecom-long-distance-inc, [http://perma.cc/6XJV-D9LA] (highlighting the FCC's action
against a telecommunications company for changing consumers' long distance carriers and
adding charges without proper authorization of consent).
138. See David J. Bilinsky, 10 Collaborative Principles for Leading a Successful ODR System
Initiative, ODR & CONSUMERS 2010 (Sept. 1, 2010), http://www.odrandconsumers2010.org/ 201
0/09/01/10-collaborative-principles-for-leading-a-successful-odr-system-initiative, [http://perma.c
c/N4JT-RT5X] (guest post by Ben Ziegler) (providing tips for increasing confidence in e-
commerce through ODR systems); see also Schmitz, supra note 107, at 235-40 (discussing need
for regulation and safety measures for ODR).
139. See Peter B. Rutledge & Anna W. Howard, Arbitrating Disputes Between Companies
and Individuals: Lessons from Abroad, 65 DISP. RESOL. J. 30, 33 (2010) (noting concerns
regarding arbitration and European law's protection of consumers from unfair arbitration
provisions).
140. See Schmitz, supra note 107, at 226 (proposing regulated ODR for consumer complaint
resolution).
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consumers on how to structure complaints and upload information
supporting their claims. Forms should ease or eliminate the need for the
expensive legal assistance required for filing complaints in litigation and
traditional F2F arbitration.14 ' The online system also should be geared for
consumers of all education levels and provide means for translations to
assist non-English speakers. Such online guidance could provide for e-
contract claims; a simplified version of what Turbotax provides for tax
filings. 142
As mentioned above, companies that provide for such user-friendly
ODR could post a trustmark or seal on their websites similar to the BBB's
seal indicating that companies comply with prescribed rules. The trustmark
and a central portal for posting companies' ODR policies and commitments
could be linked to a non-profit institution like the BBB or to the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau ("CFPB") established under the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act ("Dodd-Frank").143
Oversight is important to ensure these systems do not become kangaroo
courts.
The CFPB or another neutral institution could cheaply post
information regarding the ODR system on this central portal in a simple
and straightforward chart stating who to contact regarding complaints and
how the complaint process works. In addition, this portal could be
searchable and include information about legitimate complaints asserted
against companies and the remedies provided. Such transparency should
spark companies to improve their complaint handling processes, and help
empower consumers to pursue legitimate complaints and protect
consumers' rights regardless of status.'"
141. See Stuhimacher & Walters, supra note 48, at 657-59 (noting how communication
modes may reduce gender bias).
142. See Tax Tips Guides & Videos, TURBOTAX, https://turbotax.intuit.com/tax-tools/all-articl
es-and-videos/, [http://perma.cc/8UGQ-VGZ8] (last visited Feb. 9, 2014) (listing all tax advice by
category); Turbo Tax Basic, TURBOTAX, https://turbotax.intuit.com/personal-taxes/onlinelbasic.js
p, [http://perma.cc/5H2H-HY8C] (last visited Feb. 9, 2014) (discussing step-by-step guidance and
tax tips provided during the online filing process).
143. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code); see also Consumer Financial
Protection Agency Act, H.R. 3126, 11Ith Cong. §§I ll(a), 134(a) (2009) (proposed bill to
establish an agency to regulate consumer financial products and services and authorize the agency
to approve pilot programs for effective disclosure of consumer contract terms); About us,
CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/the-bureaul, [http://perma.cc/
FYB2-CPJ9] (last visited Jan. 1, 2014).
144. See Sharane Gott, BBB offers tips on when and how to file a complaint, BETTER Bus.
BUREAU (Apr. 24, 2013), http://www.bbb.org/blog/2013/04/bbb-offers-tips-on-when-and-how-to-
file-a-complaint/, [http://perma.cc/6K8F-P4SX]. The BBB already utilizes ODR for consumers'
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Again, some companies may resist expansion of remedies for
consumers and any such regulations. However, most should see the
benefits of lower dispute resolution costs and avoiding more costly
litigation. Furthermore, the trustmark could obtain government and
community support. This would garner consumer trust in the ODR
process, and thus consumer confidence in the companies that commit to the
process. These companies would benefit when consumers choose to buy
from those companies due to assurance that they would have means for
obtaining a remedy if a purchase goes awry.
Nonetheless, it is essential that the online mediators and arbitrators
who serve as neutrals in the ODR processes be truly neutral and properly
trained. ODR rules should require these individuals to go through training
and obtain a certification. The rules also should provide for a mechanism
to gather user feedback in order to foster continual system improvements.
In addition, the system should include an enforcement mechanism to
prevent meaningless awards. An ODR process is worthless if companies
can avoid paying awards. There are various possibilities for such a
mechanism. For example, companies that use the ODR system and benefit
from the trustmark and dispute resolution cost savings could fund an
escrow account that that would only be used to pay awards in the event that
the company fails to comply with awards within thirty days. Of course,
policymakers and companies would need to work out the details and this is
just one idea open for discussion. Enforcement also could mimic the credit
card charge-back system that provides consumers with charge reversals for
contested purchases using a credit card.145
Again, these are only initial ideas for discussion and fostering creative
brainstorming for creation of a "New Handshake" for resolution of
consumers' purchase claims. More discussion and research should follow.
The SWS and hurdles to obtaining remedies have harmed consumers'
confidence in the market, and have fostered contractual discrimination to
the detriment of those with the least resources. ODR nonetheless provides
promise for easing cost, time, and bias concerns that have hindered most
complaints. Id. These processes are non-binding unless the parties agree that the result will be
final, but companies' reputational concerns often prompt them to provide remedies on claims that
the BBB determines valid and supported by adequate information to be worthy of response. Id
145. Matt Brownell, Credit Card Chargebacks: Your Secret Weapon in Merchant Disputes,
DAILY FINANCE (Jul. 31, 2012, 1:10 PM), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2012/07/31/credit-card-
chargeback-merchant-disputes/, [http://perma.cc/C5DJ-SZ9Q] (discussing Fair Credit Billing Act
definitions of "billing errors" as being distinct from product complaints, and noting the minimum
sixty day timeframe for contacting credit card issuers, and suggesting contacting the retailer
before initiating chargeback proceedings).
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consumers from seeking remedies through traditional F2F dispute
resolution mechanisms.'46 Well-crafted online processes also help dispel
the stresses of seeking assistance by providing a structured, text-based
means for communicating needs.'47 They also may help revive companies'
commitments to consumers by making it easier for consumers to hold
companies accountable and providing companies with better information
regarding their products-which, in turn, may fuel product improvements.
V. CONCLUSION
The SWS and hurdles to obtaining remedies in B2C exchanges have
allowed businesses to relinquish responsibility to consumers and quiet
information about improprieties. These forces also have fostered
contractual discrimination in favor of the relatively few sophisticated
consumers with the requisite information and resources to protect their
interests and pursue purchase complaints. This creates a need for expanded
and equalized access to remedies through ODR in order to revive
companies' sense of responsibility-a need for a "New Handshake" to
provide consumer protections that the broken market has failed to
deliver.'48 Such an ODR system would lower costs and burdens of
pursuing purchase complaints so that all consumers, regardless of power
and resources, would feel comfortable and able to seek needed assistance.
Indeed, ODR systems are expanding worldwide and will eventually
be on every website and required by every user agreement. However, it is
essential that these systems be fair, transparent, and efficient. As such,
enforcement mechanisms and consumer education should support well-
crafted ODR systems that balance company and consumer needs.
Policymakers should develop these systems with careful eyes toward
facilitating satisfying and safe processes tailored for particular contexts.
Companies, consumers, and regulators must be forward thinking in
embracing ODR or they will be left behind.
146. Stuhlmacher & Walters, supra note 48, at 659 (noting studies showing that CMC eases
communication bias by reducing social cues and subconscious propensities present in F2F
communications).
147. See Jelle van Veenen, From :-(to :-): Using Online Communication to Improve Dispute
Resolution (Tilburg Inst. for Interdisciplinary Studies of Civil Law & Conflict Resolution Sys.,
Working Paper No. 002/2010, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1618719, [http://perm
a.cc/AH37-J9Y2] (noting how online communications can improve dispute resolution).
148. See supra Part III-IV.
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